There are few more unpleasant words in the English language than the word "discharge." In two otherwise harmless syllables, it inspires shudders and involuntary wretching. The D.C. Circuit had occasion to investigate the meaning of this word in a decision handed down today about a bank robbery that occurred in the District.

First, a word about the D.C. Circuit. This revered court of appeals has developed a reputation for making some of the most important federal law in the country. It handles appeals related to all of the federal administrative agencies and has, over its 205-year existence, developed a special reputation for sharp judges admirable for both their skill and their ability not to fall asleep while dealing with obscure FERC regulations. Chief Justice John Roberts, himself a veteran of the venerable circuit, recently published an interesting historical article about how the court developed its distinctive character.

The facts in this case won't make the history books, but they will likely make some law review case comments by aspiring D.C. Circuit law clerks. As the court tells us, Kevin Patrick Luke Brown used a semi-automatic pistol to rob a SunTrust bank in downtown D.C. He threatened the employees with the gun as they stuffed wads of cash into a bag. At one point, Brown shoved the gun into the back of an employee's head. When the bag was stuffed and Brown went to close it, the gun went off. Brown asked if anyone was hurt. No one was. The bullet had gone into the ceiling. Brown was apprehended just outside the bank.

At trial, the judge instructed the jury that Brown did not have to have discharged the gun "knowingly" in order to qualify for the mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years. Today's opinion reverses that decision.

The D.C. Circuit's three-judge panel took up the question about robbery sentencing under the court's less glamorous but equally important role of adjudicating appeals from the federal trial courts in the District of Columbia. The question is whether an accidental gun discharge, during the course of a bank robbery, qualifies as a "discharge" under a sentencing statute. The defendant receives a higher minimum sentence if a gun "is discharged" during the commission of a crime of violence.

If you think the minutiae of criminal sentencing statutes are obscure and a waste of the brain power of judges like Stephen F. Williams, a former property professor known for his scholarship in law and economics, you should take a brief minute to skim the case. For future law students and even armchair legal pundits, the opinion provides some quick insight into how the circuit courts work, and into how criminal laws are interpreted.

For starters, this issue seems to be cropping up a lot recently. The Tenth Circuit (that's over in the Rockies) held that the defendant's intent doesn't matter -- lock 'em up. And the Ninth Circuit (that's over in California) held that the defendant must exhibit "general intent," which means that the gun was discharged as a result of the defendant's intentional action, even if it didn't go off in exactly the way the defendant wanted. Despite Williams' Colorado pedigree, his opinion sides with the Ninth Circuit. Now that the D.C. Circuit, known for its tepid conservatism, and the Ninth Circuit, known for making a stink about everything, have teamed up, leaving the Tenth Circuit's Rocky Mountain reasoning high and dry, there is a genuine circuit split on the issue. Circuit split means potential for Supreme Court involvement, if it's particularly important to have the law be applied uniformly throughout the country.

If this hasn't gotten you filling out your Georgetown Law applications yet, consider the way the courts of appeals approach questions of statutory interpretation. The plain language of the statute just says discharge - not knowing discharge, purposeful discharge, and okay, we'll stop saying "discharge." You get the point.

But there are two strong traditions in criminal law that marshal against including accidental gun-going-off. First, there is a presumption that all criminal punishment requires the defendant show some degree of intent, also known as mens rea. As Williams points out, if the gun had gone off while the defendant surrendered it to the police, he might still have been guilty under the statute. (Though, technically, under the statute, he would no longer be using the gun "in relation to a crime of violence." We'll let it go, your honor.) Secondly, under what's called the rule of lenity, criminal statutes that have ambiguous meaning are interpreted to have the meaning most favorable to the defendant. This tradition fits in well with the constitutional preference for erring on the side of less rather than more punishment.

Finally, having concluded that intent was required, the opinion considers whether Brown had such intent. If he acted recklessly, for example, with the wanton disregard for others, he could still be held to the higher minimum sentence. Though Brown had criminal intent for the bank robbery, the sentencing statute required its own intent standard, and Brown didn't meet it.

So what will Brown be doing for you now? Well, he'll be going to jail, for a minimum of seven years, most likely, for "brandishing" the gun. That's a word we're happy to repeat as often as we can.

Photo by Chad Miller on Flickr. Stare DCisis thanks, as always, How Appealing for serving up good fodder.