U.S. Attorney for D.C. Resigns

We shouldn't have U.S. Attorneys prosecuting local crimes at all if for no other reason than they're awful. The number of prosecutions and convictions/pleads has steadily declined each year; they now prosecute half the offenses they did in 2003. The reasons are pretty clear: the attorneys are not from D.C., they don't care about the city, and there are zero repercussions if they don't adequately prosecute offenders. Additionally, the U.S. Attorneys have other stuff to deal with, so D.C. gets a back seat. All the more reason for D.C. to have its own ELECTED attorney general to prosecute all local crimes.

I am one of four serious citizens who each separately have asked for a Quo Warranto done by Taylor. His resignation right now stinks BIGTIME of quid pro quo with the Usurpers Obama and Holder. Stay tuned!

593 Vanderbilt Avenue, #281
Brooklyn, New York 11238
Christopher-Earl: Strunk © in esse

The Honorable Jeffrey Taylor
U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia,
United States Attorney's Office
555 4th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20530

Re: U.S. and ex rel. Strunk v Barack Hussein Obama in esse
Subj: NOTICE of Verified Quo Warranto Complaint with Title 16
Chapter 35 of The District Of Columbia Code in its entirety

The Honorable Jeffrey Taylor

I, Christopher-Earl : Strunk © in esse, relator, am the interested-party in the above referenced matter and hereby demand that your office institute a proceeding against in the name of the United States against the individual Barack Hussein Obama in esse (a/k/a Barry Soetoro) who within the District of Columbia usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully exercises, a franchise conferred by the corporate United States office of the President (POTUS) for failing to prove eligibility as a natural-born-citizen with Article 2 Section 1 Clause 5 of the united States’ Constitution as a matter of first impression. That Relator’s original Verified Complaint is attached herewith, with the proviso that relator will use the duplicate to demand a jury trial on the issues of fact and decision on question of first impression with the District Judge in Strunk v DOS et al. 08-cv-2234 by Cross Motion to the Defendant’s motion to dismiss on or before June 1, 2009 if within seven days your office has not responded in the affirmative, nevertheless will go to the District Court as of right.
Relator refers your Honor to what the Supreme Court of the united States (SCOTUS) held as instructive:

The seminal SCOTUS case which has interpreted the Quo Warranto statute is Newman v. United States ex Rel. Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537 (1915). The opinion serves as a thorough education on the history of quo warranto as well as the proper statutory interpretation. According to SCOTUS, Newman at 552, the statute applies to any public office:

The Revised Statutes declare that the District of Columbia shall be the seat of government, and “all offices attached to the seat of government shall be exercised in the District of Columbia.” The Code …provides that the… court shall have jurisdiction to grant quo warranto “against a person who unlawfully holds or exercises within the District a . . . public office, civil or military.” It was probably because of this fact that national officers might be involved that the Attorney General of the United States was given power to institute such proceedings…

…the District Code, in proper cases, instituted by proper officers or persons, may be enforceable against national officers of the United States. The sections are therefore to be treated as general laws of the United States, not as mere local laws of the District. Being a law of general operation, it can be reviewed on writ of error from this Court. American Co. v. Commissioners of the District, 224 U. S. 491; McGowan v. Parish, 228 U. S. 317.

The next essential decision is in Newman v. United States ex Rel. Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537 at 546 (1915), the Supreme Court interpreted the role of the AG and US attorney as follows:

The District Code still treats usurpation of office as a public wrong which can be corrected only by proceeding in the name of the government itself. It permits those proceedings to be instituted by the Attorney General of the United States and by the attorney for the District of Columbia. By virtue of their position, they, at their discretion and acting under the sense of official responsibility, can institute such proceedings in any case they deem proper. But there are so many reasons of public policy against permitting a public officer to be harassed with litigation over his right to hold office that the Code not only does not authorize a private citizen, on his own motion, to attack the incumbent’s title, but it throws obstacles in the way of all such private attacks. It recognizes, however, that there might be instances in which it would be proper to allow such proceedings to be instituted by a third person, but it provides that such “third person” must not only secure the consent of the law officers of the government, but the consent of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia before he can use the name of the government in quo warranto proceedings.

Further, in ANDRADE v. LAUER, 729 F.2d 1475, 234 U.S.App.D.C. 384 (1984), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has held that the defacto officer’s doctrine does not prohibit “collateral attacks” of official actions based upon a public officer’s lack of eligibility. These are not quo warranto suits to remove the official, they are civil suits to challenge a specific action of that official.
In the Andrade case, the plaintiffs were Government employees who lost their jobs to “reduction in force” ordinances which cut whole departments from the Government budget. The plaintiffs sued alleging those who did the cutting were not Constitutionally qualified to make such decisions in that their appointments violated the appointments clause of the US Constitution.
The DC District Court held that the plaintiffs had no standing other than to bring a “direct attack” in quo warranto to remove the alleged usurper. But the DC Court of Appeals reversed and said the plaintiffs, who had suffered real injuries, could bring such an action on a case by case basis if they could prove their injury in fact (being fired) was caused by a Government official who was not eligible to serve.
Further, in UNITED STATES of America ex rel. STATE OF WISCONSIN v. FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, 248 F.2d 804 (1957), the US court of Appeals, 7th Circuit, provided an on point discussion of quo warranto in the district courts:

There have been submitted to this court only two instances in which original quo warranto jurisdiction has been specifically conferred upon federal district courts. The revised statutes of 1878 vested jurisdiction in these courts of proceedings brought by the United States Attorney for the removal of persons holding office contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. Rev.Stat., Sections 563(14), 626(14), (1786). This Act was repealed in the Judicial Code of 1911, 36 Stat. 1168. In 1901, Congress specifically authorized the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to issue quo warranto in the name of the United States. Act of March 3, 1901, 31 Stat. 1419, Title 16, Section 1601 of the D.C. Code (1940). However, this grant is strictly limited and is confined solely to situations involving franchises and public offices held within the District of Columbia. There is no other specific statutory provision vesting original jurisdiction in the district courts in quo warranto actions.

Furthermore, before the Quo Warranto statute existed there is a precedent for a sitting, voted in, sworn in, Senator, Albert Gallatin was thrown out of office in 1793 for being constitutionally ineligible to be a Senator, not having the 9 year requirement as a U.S. citizen. The full congressional link and the procedure they used follows:

http://books.google.com/books?id=qkMFAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA223-IA8&lpg=PA223-IA8&dq=Albert+Gallatin+ineligible+Senator&source=bl&ots=GO4Ii8iPv7&sig=NVpzF2CVNYUnIWYpNdjESd9gvYA&hl=en&ei=YIiwSaOeOteitgfYiIHEBw&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=5&ct=result#PPA221,M1

Relator in consideration of the above referenced SCOTUS and other decisions comes forth here with a direct not collateral attack upon the usurper intransigence who after all is in esse and merely poses as the corporate administrator POTUS. The Usurper as an individual in esse only has it in his interest to regain his corporate office were the issues of fact adjudicated.

1. That relator is the sovereign employer of the POTUS who exercises authority over my personal grant of power of attorney permission given to administer the united States of America (Inc.);

2. Relator duly fired Barack Hussein Obama in his corporate capacity for cause on January 23, 2009 after he took the oath of office by timely return of the offer of contract wishing no contract thereby revoked power of attorney due to his failure to prove eligibility as a natural born citizen;

3. That Barack Hussein Obama in esse usurps that office and presumably wishes to have a Quo Warranto forum to prove his eligibility to be able to return to the corporate office capacity as evidenced by the fact he simulates the corporate POTUS duties.

4. Further as to relator standing, as the particularized injury different than the general public, is evidenced by the related FOIA case where I complaint of injury and as a result of irreparable harm caused by the Usurper personally not only the particular speech injury and informational injury, but according to the opposition counsel I am to be sanctioned for something which as of right under statute I am entitled too and having been wrongly withheld by the POTUS Executive while under the Usurper.

5. The nature of my injury caused by the Usurper is the subject of my response in opposition to a partial dismissal as to the Usurper now in default and whose actions are void ab initio, and that the Defendant DOS answer to my complaint there demands further discovery with production of documents and interrogatories, and that this action is intertwined and inseparable.

I would be more than willing on or after June 1, 2009, to elaborate on this demand with an expanded memorandum that would also encompass the respectable work of the attorney Leo Donofrio, Esq. of New Jersey, Dr. Orly Taitz, Esq. of California, Mario Apuzzo, Esq. of New Jersey and John D. Hemenway, Esq. of Washington District of Columbia as none represent relator. However this is the required statutory notice of a pre-existing intent required of me.
On a personal note of great importance to me, I am a natural-born citizen of two married natural-born born citizens that makes me eligible to become president, however my son when reaching 35 and having resided in the USA for 14 years at election may not be a natural-born citizen because my wife at the time of his birth in New York was not a citizen and as such because there is no interpretation as to the nature of Article 2 Section 1 Clause 5 is a matter of first-impression dear to me and is effecting my liberty now onward.
Your immediate response to this urgent matter is warranted and by way of a copy the additional parties-in –interest listed below they too are duly notified. I may be reached during the day at (845) 901-6767.

Sincerely yours,

Dated: May 20th, 2009 /s/ Christopher-Earl : Strunk, in esse
Brooklyn, New York _________________________________
Christopher-Earl: Strunk © in esse

Attached: Verified Quo Warranto Complaint with Demand for Jury Trial and Decision on Question of First Impression with exhibits

Cc:

The Honorable Eric Holder
U.S. Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530-0001

Barack Hussein Obama in esse
c/o The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20500